Thursday, June 15, 2006
Upside down pentagon
The next secretary of defense has a serious cleanup job to do at the pentagon. The brass that was promoted to the top in the last 5 years has turned out to be a bunch of ivory tower warriors. They have overpaid homage to Patton and failed to learn the lessons learned by the many sharp knife incursions that overextended resources and eventually fell victim to indiginous opposition. They most probably should be restricted to playing capture the flag.
Whether it was Napoleon in Russia, Alexander in India, Hitler's drive to the Caucuses, or the British Galipoly fiasco, striking with a targeted force intended to achieve total victory by securing a single objective far from home with just enough force to get to the objective yields catastrophy when any one thing goes unexpectedly. Such targeted attacks serve as excellent components of larger plans. McArthur's landing at Inchon would not have been successful without the linkup with the breakout of the Pusan perimeter. Patton's march to Messina would have meant nothing without Montgomery's march up the coast. Even the problems at Anzio were just a flanking maneuver intended to facilitate the stalled broad front march up Italy.
The Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz shock and awe blitz-kreig inspired way of waging war is only a useful battle tactic, but not a strategicly sound way to get what needs to be done. Securing military supremacy is only the first step in any war. A quick cut to a single military objective will not even provide that. All bypassed opposition assets reamin as potential threats and must be secured. This bunch was so fixated on Bhagdad that they even failed to secure their supply lines.
The new secretary will have to call on the Powell doctrine era retired brass for advice on the selection of the new chiefs. People like Gen. Shinseki who understand the totality of the requirements for a commplete victory need to once again rule the roost. The battle level tacticians should stay field commanders.
Rumsfeld and Co. understood battlefield tactics. They did not understand the strategic requirements for total victory in war. The 90% that is the pacification of the conquered territory was to them not deserving of their attention and should be left to be determined once the battle was done and the field known.
For Shinseki, the battle plan had to not only ensure initial military victory, but also the safety and security of our people given the worst case scenarios. He took into account absolutely no cooperation from the indigenous population. Yet, he planned for their security as well.
Whether it was Napoleon in Russia, Alexander in India, Hitler's drive to the Caucuses, or the British Galipoly fiasco, striking with a targeted force intended to achieve total victory by securing a single objective far from home with just enough force to get to the objective yields catastrophy when any one thing goes unexpectedly. Such targeted attacks serve as excellent components of larger plans. McArthur's landing at Inchon would not have been successful without the linkup with the breakout of the Pusan perimeter. Patton's march to Messina would have meant nothing without Montgomery's march up the coast. Even the problems at Anzio were just a flanking maneuver intended to facilitate the stalled broad front march up Italy.
The Rumsfeld/Wolfowitz shock and awe blitz-kreig inspired way of waging war is only a useful battle tactic, but not a strategicly sound way to get what needs to be done. Securing military supremacy is only the first step in any war. A quick cut to a single military objective will not even provide that. All bypassed opposition assets reamin as potential threats and must be secured. This bunch was so fixated on Bhagdad that they even failed to secure their supply lines.
The new secretary will have to call on the Powell doctrine era retired brass for advice on the selection of the new chiefs. People like Gen. Shinseki who understand the totality of the requirements for a commplete victory need to once again rule the roost. The battle level tacticians should stay field commanders.
Rumsfeld and Co. understood battlefield tactics. They did not understand the strategic requirements for total victory in war. The 90% that is the pacification of the conquered territory was to them not deserving of their attention and should be left to be determined once the battle was done and the field known.
For Shinseki, the battle plan had to not only ensure initial military victory, but also the safety and security of our people given the worst case scenarios. He took into account absolutely no cooperation from the indigenous population. Yet, he planned for their security as well.
